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INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES FOR THE 90s
by
JAGDISH BHAGWATI*

The open, multilateral tracling system, centered on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is currently at risk. The threat continues to come
from familiar directions. But there are new problems too.
PROTECTIONISM

Protectionism, of course, remains a problem. Like the cockroach, it is
indestructible: all one can hope for is that the pressures for protection are
contained. This requires continued vigilance. This is particularly so when
protectionism takes ever new forms. The postwar decline of tariffs has
focused our minds now on nontariff barriers. And the trade experts know
that administered protection, operating through the unfair use of the "unfair
trade" mechanisms such as countervailing duties (CVDs) aimed at foreign
subsidies and anti-dumping (AD) levies, is now the favourite weapon of the
protectionists. Of course, it is easier to secure relief from foreign competititon if one can allege unfair trade than if one simply says: I cannot hack it, so
grant me protectionl1
ORWELLIAN NEWSPEAK

Then again, one cannot but be depressed by the manner in which the
debate on trade policy continues to be debased, permitting protectionists and
the anti-multilateralist forces the space and success that an intellectually
honest and informed debate would deny them. I shall concentrate on just
two examples.2
Thus, consider first the important clistinction between the.fix-rule and the
fix-quantity (or, in more popular parlance, "results-oriented" or "managed

* Jagdish Bhagwati is the Arthur Lehman Professor of Political Science at Columbia
University, and Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation (1990-91). He is also
Economic Policy Adviser to the Director General of the GATI; the views expressed here
are entirely personal and preceded his taking this appointment.
1 There are several reasons, including structural changes in the world economy, which
have prompted increased resort to allegations of unfair trade in recent years. I consider
them at some length in JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK
(1991).
2 Id. In Appendix 1, I have considered several other examples of gratuitous confusion
of concepts, frequently fed by inaccurate assertions made by careless economists
pronouncing on matters where they frequently have no expertise.
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trade") trading regimes. 3 Under the former, the rules are set and then countries must accept the consequences for production and trade that follow
from them: chips must be allowed to fall where they may. Under the latter,
the trade quantities are preset: e.g. the semiconductor chips sold by the
United States in Japan must be 20% of the Japanese market or the number
of Japanese cars sold in the United States must not exceed the quota set by
Voluntary Expo1t Restraints. The distinction is best understood by considering a basketball game. Under a fix-rule system, the rules are set and then the
game determines who scores what and who wins. Under a fix-quantity system, these outcomes are decided by negotiation, i.e. by horse-trading
between the managers of the teams.
Evidently, the distinction is absolutely critical. But the recent debates
show that the proponents of "managed trade" typically confuse the case for
quantity-setting in trade with the broad case for intervention per se 4 and,
more frequently, with the narrow case for trade intervention.5 Equally, they
confuse managed trade, which implies a fix-quantity regime, with "trade
management" which refers to rule-making trade negotiations and enforcement of negotiated trade rights and obligations, all of which complement,
sustain and expand the scope of a fix-rule regime instead!
Yet another example comes from the recent debate over the U.S.-Mexico
Free Trade Area, prior to the successful renewal of fast-track authority for
another two years to negotiate it. Not merely bureucrats and politicians, but
also professional economists playing amateur politics, have argued the case
for the FTA as it it was the same as the case for FT (free trade). But it is not.
FTAs are preferential trade arrangements. So, unlike FT, they lower trade
barriers for member states, not for others. As such, they have two faces: one
is turned towards protection, looking inward for the members' markets, and
the other is towards free trade. Jacob Viner thus alerted us to the fact that an
FTA could divert trade from competitive nonmember suppliers (who continue facing trade barriers) to uncompetitive member exporters (who do
3

The phrases, fix-rule and fix-quantity, were introduced in my PROTECTIONISM
(1988), to contrast sharply the two types of trading regimes.
4 Market failures lead to the conventional case for assisting the invisible hand. But
international trade theorists in the 1960s and 1970s examined carefully different types of
market failure and showed that the appropriate intervention to fix market failure need
not be trade protection but often required instead domestic policies targetted at the source
of the failure. Again, during the late 1970s and 1980s, international trade theorists have
made another scientific breakthrough by exploring systematically the political-economytheoretic argument that interventions in practice may be harmful rather than helpful
because they are shaped by pressure groups in pluralistic systems or by predatory
governments or branches thereof.
5 Even when trade (as distinct from domestic) intervention is appropriate, economists
generally prefer price rather than quantity instruments. E.g. they prefer ad valorem tariffs
to import quotas, for a variety of reasons. Sophisticated theoretical arguments can indeed
be made for quantity interventions of particular varieties in specific situations, but these
have little correspondence to the arguments advanced by the "managed traders".
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not). A sound case for any specific FfA cannot therefore be made unless the
analyst starts by confronting instead of obfuscating, at the very outset, this
important implication of the FfA's being a preferential arrangement.
THE

GAIT-CENTERED MULTILATERAL SYSTEM

The threats to the trading system that I wish to address are more unconventional. They arise with respect to the three underlying principles of the
GATI:
1. Trade should be conducted by rules, not by preset quantities;
2. Trade barriers should be removed, and new disciplines established, by
mutuality of concessions rather than by coercion leading to unrequited concessions by the weak to the strong; and
3. Trade should be conducted on a nondiscriminatory basis among the
GATI members, requiring therefore the extension of Most-FavouredNation (MFN) treatment to one another.
THE THREAT OF MANAGED TRADE

The fix-rule system, embodied in the GATI, is increasingly considered by
articulate and agitated critics to be obsolete and inappropriate to current
needs. The skepticism comes from two directions. It is fuelled by the notion
that Japan is not capable of playing by rules, whether by wicked design or
due to cultural affliction, and that only managed trade with Japan can generate gains from trade with it. Equally, it is fed by the fear that foreign nations,
with more active technology and industrial policy, will take away high-tech
industries from the United States.
Commentators such as James Fallows have argued that the Japanese are
culturally conditioned to work with quantities because, faced with demands
to open their markets, they ask: How much do you want us to import? Quite
aside from the fact that this probably generalizes from a few examples, it
fails to consider the fact that the Japanese experience with trade with the
outside world since the 1930s has been that of initial success with exports
under a rules-based regime, followed by demands for quantitative, Voluntary
Export Restraints on Japanese exports. Now, these demands have spread to
the import side of the ledger, with complaints that Japan's imports are too
low anlmust be pushed up according to quantitative targets: an innovation
that I have christened as Voluntary Import Expansions. Is it not possible
then that, faced by these continuous impositions of quantitative limits and
targets, and proliferating demands for them in political discourse, the Japanese may have come to the conclusion that a fix-rule trading system will be
denied to them and that they must trade instead with us by quantity-setting?
Is it improbable that, faced with ceaseless charges today that "low" imports
are proof of closed markets, the Japanese respond: how much should we
import to get you off our backs? In short, the Japanese preference for quanti-
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tities over rules may be a consequence of our witting intrusion of politics into
trade rather than of Japanese unwitting intrusion of culture into trade. 6
The problem with high-tech is a complex one. Most governments are concerned with getting an "adequate" share of high-tech production because,
rightly or wrongly (and most economists would argue, wrongly), they are
convinced that high-tech industries have untold externalities which make
one dollar worth of high tech worth several dollars. This makes them, conveniently for those in high-tech whose profits stand to gain from the spread of
such convictions, highly prone to suspicision that foreign rivals, especially
successful ones, are the beneficiaries of "artificial" subventions from their
governments. Thus, the United States becomes prone to attacking Japan for
promoting R&D consortia, for low cost of capital as a source of "unfair"
advantage etc. In tum, foreign governments raise the question of the advantages that they see accruing to American aerospace and high-tech from
R&D funds and contracts going out from the immense military establishment, from the support given to science and engineering at universities such
as MIT and Caltech through programs such as the National Science Foundation, etc. In short, each side points the finger at the other, justifiably arguing that the other has policies that influence the market outcome, whether
intended or not. My view is that the high-tech question is so sensitive
because of the political fear of losing these industries, due to "unfair competition" to others, that the issue must be managed if these concerns are not to
lead to "managed trade" where politicians simply say: "I want so much produced at home, and I shall bend trade, through targets (such as in the semiconductor chips agreement between the US and Japan), to accommodate
that production". My preferred way to manage the issue is to develop multilateral fora where the net balance of artificial advantages to high-tech can be
assessed by impartial judges, in place of the current de facto practice of getting the weak parties into bilateral confrontations with the strong, at the
instance and insistance of the strong: a procedure that is calculated to produce political rather than judicious and fair outcomes.
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM

This problem has arisen in an alternative, and more dramatic and dangerous, way in recent US trade policy, in the form of the socalled 301 and Super
301 actions. The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, through Sections 301-310, addresses the generic issues of enforcing treaty-granted US
trade rights and, more controversially, creating new rights. It is the latter
objective, where "unreasonable" practices of other trading nations, not covered by existing trade treaties and corresponding obligations, are targetted
6

I have examined Japan-bashing and Japan-fixation in other manifestations in THE
TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK, supra note 1.
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for removal by threatening tariff retaliation which, in practice, is GATIillegal, that has raised a serious threat to the GAIT system.7
The use of such threats to "pry open" foreign markets and establish new
disciplines is, of course, the weapon of the strong against the weak. It is
contrary also to the GATI approach of mutuality of acceptance of new obligations. The essential argument in its behalf is that if the strong party is
benign, and uses the weapon, not to extract unrequited concessions for itself,
but to advance socially desirable goals, then we should applaud this
innovation.
But the problem is precisely that the assumption of a benign dictator cannot be made, especially in trade policy. Trade policy is typically influenced,
at times even determined, by sectional interests, by pressure groups seeking
their own profits, rather than by the guardians of larger interests, whether
national or international. Thus, one cannot rule out the use of such an
instrument as 301 for extraction of unrequited trade advantages or to create
privileged positions in foreign markets for one's producers or to advance
agendas at the GAIT that reflect national interests rather than the needs of
an efficient trading regime. 8In my view, this condemns the 301 type of
aggressive unilateralism as an appropriate way of creating new disciplines.
REGIONALISM

The question of "regionalism" is more debatable. Preferential trade
arrangements among any subset of GAIT members which eliminate trade
barriers among the members but not equally for nonmembers, obviously do
not extend MFN to all GAIT members. Therefore, such "regional"
arrangements violate the essence of multilateralism and hence its
advantages.
But Article XXIV of the GATT permits such preferential arrangements
as long as they take the form of full trade integration: in the form of Free
Trade Areas and Customs Unions. 9 The exception is largely a political one:
if some countries wish to integrte closely by removing trade barriers altogether among themselves, then they are acquiring one key attribute of a federal nation state: after all, federal countries such as the US, Canada and
India have few restrictions on interstate commerce. As such, the GATT does
not stand in the way of such efforts even though, from the viewpoint of trade
7

That the raising of tariffs in retaliation would be GAIT-illegal, and the economic
issues raised by the use of such retaliation by a strong country against weaker trading
partners, are matters discussed in considerable depth by several contributors to
AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM, (J. Bhagwati & H. Patrick eds.). In particular, Robert
Hudec provides a brilliant legal analysis while the economic implications are analysed by
John McMillan and myself.
8 Id. These are precisely the kinds of questions explored by McMillan and myself in
Bhagwati and Patrick.
9 The reason for this excpetion is discussed in greater depth by me in THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK, supra note 1.
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barriers per se, it seems odd that the GAIT should permit FfAs and CUs
which discriminate fully (by reducing intermember trade barriers to nothing) while denying lesser preferential trade reductions which discriminate
partially!
The US, which properly considered FfAs (and CUs, distinguished from
FfAs by having a common external tariff) to be a mixed bag because their
preferential nature implied that they were less beneficial than full multilateralism and might even be harmful if trade diversion was a principal consequence, has now changed its mind. After the US-Israel FfA, it joined
Canada in one and is now engaged in negotiating one also with Mexico.
Others with Chile, and possibly other nations of South America, are being
considered. There is room for concern here.
The popular view is that the US can ride two horses (FfAs and Ff) at the
same time; but little attention has been paid to the possibility that they face
different directions. But the leadership of the US in the multilateral regime
implies that the simultaneous embrace of the regional route may send a signal undercutting the multilateral system. This is particularly so since many
in Congress, and some among the economists, believe that the "GAIT is
dead" or that it should be killed; and for them, the regional route is not a
complement to, but a susbstitute for, the multilateral route.
Besides, any perception that the US commitment to multilateralism is
eroding would have unique significance and serious consequences. The leadership role of the US in creating and sustaining the postwar GAIT-centered
multilateral trading system is wellknown. Despite the rise of the EC and
Japan as economic powers and trading nations, neither has shown any willingness or aptitude for sharing that role.
The proponents of the regional route for the US also seem to believe that
regionalism will lead more surely to multilateralism than multilateralism
itself, that the regional blocs provide a surer and swifter way to a shared goal
because multilateralism is slow while the blocs, instead of fragmenting the
world economy, will in tum coagulate into universal free trade.
Unfortunately, this optimistic scenario ignores the evidence that preferential arrangements are often fed by interests that seek privileged access to
markets, and in tum spawn such interests. These interests argue forcefully
that "these are our markets": unabashed statements to that effect are to be
found in the EC as it moves ahead on its "1992" program and also in the
United States as the FfA with Mexico is discussed. 10 This tends to make
10

Thus, for instance, Mr.Agnelli whose complement of Italian cars run, not on gas,
but on VERs against Japanese cars, has expressed such sentiments. So has Mr.Whitmore,
the CEO of Eastman Kodak, when discussing the FfA with Mexico. Astonishingly, so
have the economists who wrote an Eastman Kodak pamphlet where they recommended
the regional route because of the "privileged access" to markets that this would open up
to US corporations. See Dornbusch, et.al., Meeting World Challenges: United States
Manufacturing in the 1990s, pamphlet sponsored and issued by Eastman Kodak
Company, Rochester, New York. Also see the scathing comments on these authors'
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the blocs inward-looking and not exactly desirous of cutting trade barriers
on one another and sacrificing their privileged, preferential positions within
member markets.11
Equally, the larger a nation or a bloc, the less also tends to be its perceived
need to have external trade, fostering the attitude that "our market is big
enough". I have me across economists who ask: if we have a large enough
trading bloc, is it worth the hassle of endless arguments with other blocs,
such as the EC, over trade for the limited extra gains that inter-bloc trade
would yield?
Both factors, that "these are our markets" and "our market is big
enough", militate against the easy notion that nations should tum into blocs
and will then tum to universal free trade. In fact, the Columbia University
political scientist, Edward Mansfield, has recently produced an interesting
econometric analysis of trade flows and relative group size. Estimated over a
century of data, Mansfield's analysis strongly suggests that, while the two
situations of one hegemon and of no hegemon but all countries of inconsequential size are each associated with liberal trade, a situation characterised
by a few middle-level economic powers _ which is what a few blocs would
correpsond to _militates against trade and an open trading system.12
There is, of course, nothing that requires that what happened before must
happen again. But there is enough here to make us pause and ask if it is not
the wiser course to stick exclusively to the multilateral route that assures
nonfragmentation of the world economy, even though it is slower.
And, if we nonetheless persist in going the regional route, we must ask
the "second-best" question: what can we do that would make the regional
critique of the GATI by M. Finger, Picturing America's Future: Kodak's Solution of
America's Trade Exposure, The World Economy, Vol.12(4), pp.377-380.
11 Also, political- economy arguments suggest that the blocs will tend to be trade
diversionary fairly effectively these days. Recall that today's protectionism takes the form
of administered protection: often, the "fair trade" remedies are used unfairly to harass
foreign rivals and to effectively protect. Now, if the US and Mexico go through with their
FTA, and if US exports ofyo-yos threatens Mexican production ofyo-yos. What do you
think is likely to happen? In the old days, when tariffs were the protectionist weapon,
Mexican producers would have had to lump it and Mexico would have enjoyed gains
from US exports. Now, the more probable outcome is that Mexicans will start antidumping actions against the more efficient Far Eastern exporters of yo-yos,
asccommodating the US (just as the US would then accommodate Mexico: both
exchanging "privileged" access to each other's markets) at the expense of others. Indeed,
what is the point of having a preferential trade arrangement if you do not exploit its
preferential nature? None of these key questions have been worried about in the recent
US-Mexico FTA debate since none of the few vocal proponents of the FTA have been
trade specialists and they are unburdened by the doubts that scientific knowledge must
create.
12 See Edward Mansfield, "The Concentration of Capabilities and International
Trade", Paper delivered at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science
Association, San Francisco, Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 1990.
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route more consonant with the objective of worldwide free trade? The architects of Article XXIV did not expect FfAs to become a major option and
therefore did not devote explicit thought to this question when sanctioning
them. We must now reexamine Article XXIV and add more restrictions to
what it sanctions.
In particular, I have recently suggested that FfAs should not be sanctioned, but only CUs which have common external tariffs. Since the US is
the hub of the new regional trade blocs being considered with South American countries, this would force these countries to lower their external tariffs
also down to the US level (which is very low), thus reducing the scope of
trade diversion. Also, openness to admission of other GATI members must
be built in as a mandatory requirement, to countervail effectively the inwardlooking tendency of preferemtial trading blocs. 13
CONCLUDING REMARKS

While the threats that I have identified _ managed trade, aggressive unilateralism and regionalism _ are matters of serious concern, and require our
sustained vigilance and creative responses, a larger and more insidious threat
comes from the rise of concerns over "unfair trade" and the associated tendency to consider that gainful trade among trading nations with different
institutions and myriad policies is not possible because these differences
imply the absence of "level playing fields".
This is a large topic and one which threatens to undermine the very basis
for rules-based trade. For, there is no way that we can possibly hope to "harmonize" the innunerable differences in policies and institutions among countries. If we entertain this kind of objection, as we increasingly have in our
Structural Impediments Initiative talks with the Japanese (where we have
objected to their retail distribution system, their infrastructure spending,
etc.) and with the Mexicans (who must now discuss environment, workers'
rights, safety standards etc. before the FfA will be signed), then we have
given a deadly weapon to protectionists, anti-multilateralists, aggressive unilateralists, and managed traders: indeed, to all who see little virtue in a rulesbased trading system such as that the GATI embodied. I see the 1990s as the
decade when international economists will have to confront frontally this
problem before it cripples the world trading system. 14

13

I have discussed changes in Article XXIV in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT
supra note 1.
14 I have considered analytical ways of tackling this threat in "What is Left of
Comparative Advantage?," Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper, 112 East 64th
Street, New York, NY 10021; June 1991.
RISK,

